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Abstract 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
In 2008, Paul Krugman from Princeton University was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences by the 
Central Bank of Sweden, for his “analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity”. In this paper 
we survey the literature, known as the New Economic Geography (NEG), launched by Krugman (1991). In 
particular, we focus on four topics: (i) NEG roots, (ii) NEG rationale; (ii) the spatial impact of international 
trade on global economic imbalances; and (iv) the impact of international trade on urban structure. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Introduction 
According to Venables (1998), a key question for the future development of the world economy is, 
how global integration impacts on the location of economic activity? In particular, what is the 
effect, at international and regional level, of international trade openness on the spatial pattern of 
production, welfare and trade? This question, for example, was in the center of the political debate 
over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Hanson (1998) points out that most of 
the U.S. congressional representatives from districts near Mexico strongly supported NAFTA, while 
those ones from districts close to Canada offered resistance. Such an attitude toward NAFTA 
reflects the perception that firms would move away from northern states to the south to reach new 
markets. Another example, given by Venables (1995), is the concern about the spatial implications 
of the European Union (EU) enlargement by the end of 2004. 
By using the Ricardian comparative advantage theory, especially the widely employed 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson version, as a standard tool, we could find that the determinants of 
spatial patterns of production would be based on differences in factor endowments, technologies, 
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preferences or trade policies. Therefore countries or regions would specialize according to their 
comparative advantage. However, Venables (1998) states that an issue that cannot be adequately 
addressed under this theoretical framework is the location of economic activity across countries or 
regions, where endowments are broadly similar (eg. the EU) or within which factors are mobile (eg. 
the US). The conventional trade theory would predict that economic activity should be uniform but 
this is not the case. Even more, there is not convergence. 
Although this topic is inherently very important, Krugman (1979) and Fujita et al. (1999) 
consider that until the early 1990s geographic considerations have been neglected by mainstream 
economics. For example, Krugman and Livas (1996) claim that in geographic production 
concentration as the growth of large cities has been obliquely addressed the development economics 
literature. Fortunately, there is a long tradition of analysis in spatial economics and, as Krugman 
(1998b) recognizes, spatial economics has received considerable attention in recent years. Both 
factors have motivated a theoretical approach known as NEG, which provides an interesting 
framework to answer our initial questions. This concurs with Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) for 
whom: 
“… many of the NEG ideas have been around for a long time in the works of economic geographers and 
location theorist. However, NEG has the fundamental merit of having framed those ideas within a general 
equilibrium model encompassing most of these ideas. This has drawn economic geography and location 
theory from the periphery to the center of mainstream economic theory. More importantly, it has made 
already existing ideas more amenable to empirical scrutiny and policy analysis.” 
Krugman (1991), Fujita (1993) and Venables(1996) are regarded as having given birth to the 
NEG paradigm, which uses full-fledged general equilibrium models with monopolistic competition 
à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The NEG literature could be divided according to two mechanisms of 
agglomeration. One is allowing labor mobility, which is a distinctive feature at regional level. The 
other is incorporating backward and forward linkages but impedes labor mobility, which is a 
distinctive feature at international level. 
At regional level, Krugman (1991) and Fujita (1993) show that the combination of increasing 
returns to scale, trade costs and the mobility of industrial labor force creates a feedback process of 
industry agglomeration. Advantages (or centripetal forces) for firms of being close to large product 
and labor markets arise from reductions in trade costs and nominal wages. Moreover, agglomeration 
attracts workers because it induces a wider product variety and higher real wages As more firms 
locate in one production site, this one turns out to be more profitable. Yet, there are disadvantages 
(or centrifugal forces) of agglomeration. Firms face more competition in the product and labor 
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markets and workers face higher congestion costs. Therefore, there is room for agglomeration as 
long as advantages generated by it outweigh its disadvantages. Metropolises like Tokyo, Sao Paulo 
or Bombay are examples of cities where agglomeration equilibrium has not been reached yet.  
At international level, Krugman and Venables (1995), Venables (1995) and Puga (1999) show 
that without labor immobility backward and forward linkages happen to be a mechanism of 
agglomeration: firms produce and purchase inputs. For firms clustering means lower input costs and 
a larger product market. International trade costs determine the importance of both linkages in 
location decisions. 
Here, it is noteworthy that two elements are essential in firms´ location decisions: trade costs and 
increasing returns to scale. The former drive firms to supply near large markets; the latter drive 
firms prefer to serve from a single location. Almost all the initial ideas on location theory assume 
economies of scale, which enforces geographic concentration of economic activities. For example, 
within the German tradition of Weber (1909), Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1954); an exception is 
Von Thünen (1826). Yet such works are developed within a partial equilibrium framework. In a 
general equilibrium context, by assuming both constant returns to scale and positive trade costs it is 
hard to realize why the economy does not fall into a Robinson Crusoe type, where each household 
produces her own consumption. This result is known as the “folk theorem” of spatial economics. 
Thus it is fair to say that spatial issues make more sense with increasing returns to scale and positive 
trade costs.  
For Brakman et al. (2001), psychological, sociological, cultural and historical forces are behind 
spatial clustering. Although these are valid perspectives, in this paper we review the literature 
related to the impact of trade openness on geography under the NEG approach. But first survey the 
NEG intellectual background. In particular, we devote our attention to the main ideas out of 
economists, geographers and regional scientists that have contributed to build the NEG ideas. The 
novelty of this paper is that it covers theoretical and empirical papers regarding international trade. 
It is worth mentioning some surveys have also focused on the NEG background.
1
 Brakman y 
Garretsen (2009) argue that Krugman (1991) is closely linked to Krugman´s (1979, 1980) trade 
theories. Fujita and Thisse (2009) relate both the Urban Economics literature and Location theory to 
the NEG framework. Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) pay attention on the main contributions of 
location theory by geographers and regional scientists to NEG. They divide their analysis in two 
parts: The location of firms as a result of an individual decision, and the location of the industry as a 
result of firms´ interactions. Head and Mayer (2003) examine empirical strategies to test NEG 
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features and predictions. Ottaviano and Puga (1998) focus on comparative advantage and market 
access considerations to explain the spatial distribution of economic activity. Venables (1998) 
reviews the old tradition of development economics and regional economics to link spatial 
agglomeration and cumulative causation. Krugman (1998a, 1998b) states that old ideas on spatial 
economics were neglected by mainstream economics due to technical obstacles. The main one was 
the impossibility to fit a model with increasing returns to scale. Quigley (1998) links urban diversity 
and economic growth and presents a chronological description of this issue. Fujita and Thisse 
(1996) present the main contributions of location theory and standard economic theory to NEG. 
The reminder of the paper is divided up as follows. Section 1 presents NEG intellectual roots. 
Section 2 provides the economic rationale of the NEG paradigm. In section 3, we survey the 
literature related to Puga´s (1999) remarkable theoretical outcome: industrial concentration has a 
bell-shaped
2
 relationship with international trade costs. Our aim is not only to describe the most 
relevant contributions of these specific research lines within trade theory, but to present the main 
technical aspects of such literature. In particular, we pay attention to their assumptions, 
mathematical tricks, unrealistic results and empirical test possibilities. In section 4, we cope with 
the effects of trade openness on cities´ size. The NEG literature related to this issue is relatively 
scarce. It is divided into two parts: One refers to theoretical works; the other refers to empirical 
research. Finally, some implications of our survey, in terms of main NEG shortcomings and the way 
forward, are presented. 
 
1. Intellectual Underpinnings 
Constant returns to scale imply that activities are divisible, thus each activity can be carried out at 
any scale without sacrificing efficiency. Thus, autarky is a competitive equilibrium involving 
positive trade costs. However, Starrett (1978) proves that if indivisibilities are assumed instead, then 
there is no a competitive equilibrium. So understanding spatial patterns requires deviating from 
Starret´s (1978) setting. As Fujita et al.(1999) proceed, we identify the antecedents of NEG into 
three alternative theories on industrial location: Marshall-Scitovsky externalities, urban economics 
and regional science. 
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Marshall-Scitovsky Externalities 
Economic agglomeration could arise as a consequence of the presence of externalities. In the 
literature there are two dominant points of view with respect to externalities. On the one hand, 
Marshall (1920) explains different ways in which industry’s output as an argument of firms´ 
production function foster agglomeration, such as, informational spillovers that expand firms´ 
production set when they cluster together; access to thick consumers and inputs markets, as well as 
the formation of high skilled labor force based on the accumulation of human capital and face-to-
face communications. This ensures that both unemployment and labor shortage is unlikely. On the 
other hand, Scitovsky´s (1954) externalities can be divided into two categories: technological 
externalities and pecuniary externalities. Technological externalities refer to the direct impact of 
production and consumption activities on production and consumption sets. The market structure 
associated with this type of externality is perfect competition. Ottaviano and Thiesse (1997) 
consider that an example of this type of externality arises in certain location if the arrival of new 
firms increases the efficiency of local firms because they enhance the productivity of labor through 
social learning process. Pecuniary externalities are the benefits of economic interactions that are 
transmitted through market prices. The market structure associated to pecuniary externalities is 
imperfect competition. Ottaviano and Thiesse (1997) consider that an example of pecuniary 
externality could be the reduction of output prices due to additional supply generated by the inflow 
of new firms in certain location. 
It is worth noting two points. First, Marshallian externalities turn out to be a combination of 
technological externalities and pecuniary externalities. Second, as a result of the first point 
explained above the market structure associated with each of the Marshallian externalities is not 
straightforward
3
. Externalities seem to be unrelated to agglomeration, but they are essential 
ingredients of the NEG rationale. 
 
Urban Economics 
Fujita et. al. (1999) point out that urban economics is a branch of the economics which has been 
forced to take spatial concerns into consideration. Von Thünen (1826) is a pioneer model in urban 
economics, and it remains as a benchmark to this day for its clear exposition of land use 
surrounding a city. It is worth mentioning that this model does not rely on scale economics. His 
setting assumes the existence of a plain which is homogenous in every attribute. In this plain there 
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is a single urban center. Outside the urban center, agricultural producers sell their crops in the city. 
There are positive trade costs associated with transporting agricultural produces to the city, which 
differ for the various crops. The prices for these crops might also differ. The model analyzes how 
the farmer determines her location across the plain. Each farmer wants to be as close to the city as 
possible to minimize trade costs. The motivation to be close to the town pushes land rents up near 
the city. Each farmer thus faces a tradeoff between land rents and trade costs.  
Von Thünen (1826) shows that competition for location ensures that the equilibrium allocation 
of land among the agricultural producers is efficient. For every type of crop there is a bid-rent curve 
which indicates, as a function of the distance to the city, how much farmers are willing to pay for 
the land. Bid–rent curves differ by crops due to different given prices for those crops and their 
respective trade costs. It turns out that the farmers of a particular kind of crop are able to outbid 
their competitors for any given distance to the city. In figure 1, we can observe that as producers 
move away from the city center, producers of A outbid the other two groups of farmers. Between 
points b and c, producers of B are willing to pay the highest rents; Beyond c, producers of C pay the 
highest rents. 
Figure 1. Bid-rent curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
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Von Thünen (1826) has an important reappearance in Alonso (1964) who reinterprets it by 
substituting commuters for farmers and a central business district for an isolated city. This model 
again yields concentric rings of land use, and it is a seminal paper for an extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature on urban sprawling.
4
 Nevertheless, such a framework has an important 
shortcoming: the existence of a town or a business district is simply assumed. It does not answer 
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how land use is determined when the location of the town is itself endogenous. The Von Thünen 
(1826) model is complemented with the concept of externalities in subsequent literature. 
 
Regional Science 
Weber (1909) is also a partial equilibrium model, which frames the problem of location in terms of 
an individual producer who takes the locations of other producers and all prices (including her own) 
as given. Subsequent work has enlarged on this, notably by letting prices be endogenous, and by 
considering strategic considerations of location decisions from different firms. Nonetheless, the 
geographical distribution of demand, and the location of inputs sources outside the industry in 
question are given.  
Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1954)
5
 explain the location of cities and differentiate cities by the 
various functions they perform. Both works assume that agents are evenly distributed across a 
featureless plain; the supply of goods and services consumed by the agents involves increasing 
returns to scale with positive trade costs. Central places serving the surrounding agents arise as a 
result of the trade-off between trade costs and scale economies. Christaller (1933) points out that 
this will create a hierarchically organized large number of market towns. A large city will produce 
all types or varieties of goods; small cities that cluster around the large one will produce a limited 
amount of varieties of goods; and the variety of goods produced by villages, which are around small 
cities will be even less than small cities. Lösch (1954) concludes that the form of this hierarchical 
system will be hexagonal. This story can be understood at many levels. For example, small districts 
could be scattered around larger districts, all eventually centering on the downtown. A shortcoming 
with this approach is that their exercise (rather than a causal model) describes planning solutions 
rather than market outcomes. The economic rationale behind the actions of firms and consumers are 
not addressed. The German school was aware that their story lacked of optimizing agents and 
general equilibrium considerations. 
According to Krugman (1998a), the idea that agglomeration involves a circular process is not 
new. Harris (1954) and Pred (1966) develop a model in which firms choose locations with good 
access to markets and suppliers. This decision improves the access to market and suppliers. 
Krugman (1998b) considers that Harris (1954) and Pred (1966) provide a coherent and intuitively 
compelling story about urban agglomeration.  
In Harris (1954) firms produce in sites with “market potential” defined as 
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where Mj is the demand of location j for goods of location i. Dij is the distance between locations i 
and j. Using the value of retail sales per U.S. county, his results show that highly industrialized 
regions were also locations with high “market potential”. This supports the notion of clustering of 
economic activity is driven not only by the supply side but by the demand side as well. Under this 
result Harris (1954) suggests that production is self-reinforcing. Firms tend to produce in regions 
with high “market potential”; and “market potential” of regions tend to be higher in locations where 
firms decide to produce. 
Pred (1966) is interested in the dynamics of regional growth by working with a simple “base-
multiplier” model of regional income. The study starts with a projection of the export earnings of a 
region (its sales to other regions inside and outside the country), then uses an estimate of the share 
of income spent within the region to compute a multiplier on that base. Thus, if export income is 
$10 billion and 60 percent of such income is spent locally, then regional income will be 10/(1-
.6)=$25 billion. Pred (1966) argues, however, that both the size of the export base and the share of 
income spent locally are increasing functions of the size of the economy. A sufficiently large scale 
economy could take off in a self-reinforcing dynamics of growth. For example, the large market 
might make profitable to produce locally goods that had been previously imported from other 
regions. This would increase the multiplier of the region’s export base, leading to a further 
expansion of income, which would lead to still more local production. 
 
2. The Rationale behind the New Economic Geography 
The economic activities distributed across space can be explained, according to Overman et al. 
(2003), by using two spatial concepts: first-nature and second-nature geography. The former is the 
physical geography of coasts, mountains, and endowments of natural resources. The latter emerges 
as the outcome of agent’s actions to overcome the constraints imposed by first-nature geography. 
Factor endowment-based trade theory considers the elements of the first-nature geography. Second-
nature geography focuses on the implications of space and distance on agent´s behavior. NEG takes 
this second point of view after controlling for the first-nature. In this vein, the intuition behind the 
concentration economic activities is conceived as the outcome of two types of dynamic forces: 
Centripetal forces and centrifugal forces. NEG then combines and simplifies the ideas of Marshall 
(1920) and Scitovsky (1954) to formalize this intuitive explanation.  

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We can describe this formalization as follows. First, by defining specifically the centripetal 
forces, which are the Marshallian externalities already explained. Yet, as Scitovsky (1954) points 
out, each one is formed by two components: pure externalities and pecuniary externalities. Then, in 
real terms we may say that there are six kinds of centripetal forces. NEG picks up a particular 
centripetal force: the pecuniary component of the market size Marshallian externality. For 
Henderson (2001), there are two sources that generate this externality: backward and forward 
linkages. The former arise when a location with high demand attracts firms to move there. The latter 
arise because a large local markets support the production of intermediate goods at low cost.  
Second, we define the centrifugal forces according to Krugman (1998a): Immobility of factors as 
land, natural resources and, at international context, workers. Such forces drive against 
concentration of production. From the demand side, dispersed factors are positively correlated to 
consumers markets. Then producers have an incentive to move close to consumers. From the supply 
side, production must go where the factors are. Land rents drive up due to concentration of 
economic activity. Higher rents are a disincentive for agglomeration. And finally, concentration 
generates pure negative externalities such as congestion. NEG selects either factor immobility or 
congestions costs as a dispersion force.  
For modeling strategy reasons, more than for empirical considerations, NEG has chosen those 
particular forces. Both forces create what Arthur (1989) calls “positive feedback” dynamics: 
production will tend to concentrate where there is a large market, but the market will be large where 
production is concentrated. This story, where agglomeration of economic activity is driven by two 
opposite forces is not new. De la Blanche (1921) explains the same idea; and, as we pointed out, 
Harris (1954) and Pred (1966) use this story as their central theme. Behind it was the assumption of 
increasing returns to scale at the firm´s level. Other papers also assume it as Weber (1909), that 
establishes that producer’s location decision is the result of minimizing the combining costs of 
producing and shipping given that there is a single production site. Christaller´s (1933) and Lösh´s 
(1954) assumption are that some locations cannot support certain activities. In sum, agglomeration 
requires increasing returns of scale at the level of the firm. However, a space consideration also 
implies agglomeration costs. Otherwise, all the production will be set up in one location. 
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Table 1. Geographical Concentration Driving Forces 
Centripetal forces Centrifugal forces 
Market size effects Immobile factors 
Thick labor markets Land rents 
Informational spillovers Pure external diseconomies 
Source: Krugman (1998a) 
Krugman (1998a) asserts that this story was widely known in economics until 1990. 
Unfortunately, mainstream economics had paid little attention to most stories of location issues 
despite the fact of its simplicity and intuitive logic. The reason is that under economies of scale 
perfect competition is not feasible. In the 1950s and 1960s there were non-tractable models of 
imperfect competition. NEG consists of full general-equilibrium models, in which budget 
constraints on both money and resources are carefully specified. And the geographical distributions 
of population, demand and supply are all endogenous.  
Spatial issues can be analyzed in two areas if we consider the centripetal forces that drive the 
formation of economic clusters of firms and households. First, informational spillovers under 
perfect competition by solely taking its pure externality component. Second, market size effects by 
solely taking its pecuniary component under monopolistic competition. We survey the second point. 
A third point of view arises when we consider spatial competition under strategic interaction. 
Hotelling (1929) is the seminal work to this third point. 
According to Fujita and Thisse (1996), models related to pure externalities consider spatial 
equilibria under the influence of nonmarket interactions, which typically involve communication of 
knowledge, ideas and tacit information between agents (firms and/or household). For Ottaviano and 
Thisse (1997), these pieces of information constitute impure public goods that generate spillover 
effects from one agent to another. Informational spillovers models have been developed in urban 
economics with the aim to explain agglomeration of specific economic activities within a city or 
industrial district.  
The models that consider market size effects like NEG are an adequate framework to explain 
interregional agglomerations such as the industrial distribution pattern in Europe. However, they 
can also be used to explain large metropolis as Krugman and Livas (1996). 
Space finally made it into the standard economics because imperfect competition turned to be 
tractable. There are four revolutionary waves or phases that raised from imperfect competition 
models. The New Industrial Organization began with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which formalizes 
the concept of monopolistic competition by Chamberlain (1933). Both works develop tools that 
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triggered what is known as the New Trade Theory (NT) in the 1980s and the New Growth Theory 
and New International Economics in 1990s. Krugman (1991) is the seminal paper of NEG. In 
international theory, this framework has allowed international economists to explain intra-industry 
trade as Krugman (1980, 1981) do in a framework that is tractable and flexible to model imperfect 
competitive markets. A contribution to turn Dixit and Stigliz´s (1977) framework into a spatial 
model is the concept of iceberg type trade cost. 
Chamberlain (1933) introduced the concept of monopolistic competition which is based in four 
assumptions. First, each firm produces at most one type of product. Second, each firm faces a 
downward sloping demand curve. Third, profits are zero. And fourth, a price change by one firm 
has minimum effects on the demand of any other firm’s product. Under this framework there are 
non strategic considerations. Each potential firm faces a residual demand D(pi; pj) and a U shaped 
average cost curve. Equilibrium with free entry implies that the residual demand for each firm is 
tangent to its corresponding average cost curve. The quantity produced is less than the quantity that 
minimizes average cost or equivalently fixed costs are spread over few units. As Tirole (1988) this 
is more clearly when the average cost is defined as (fix cost+margina cost*q)/q, where the optimal 
quantity is infinite. 
There is only one face of perfect competition. However, imperfect competition can be modeled 
in many ways depending on the assumptions and the issues to address as strategic behavior, 
preferences of consumers or type of good. Dixit and Stigltz (1977) has been a workhorse in many 
areas of economics. Nevertheless, as Chamberlain (1933), it is a very restrictive model in several 
assumptions: symmetry among varieties, the resulting absence of both monopoly rents in 
equilibrium, no strategic behavior of firms, homogenous technology and representative agent. 
Quigley (1998) analyzes Dixit and Stiglitz´s (1977) model in its spatial version. On the 
consumption side, there is a representative household whose utility depends on traded goods, space 
and a variety of goods. The utility function exhibits constant elasticity of substitution. The market 
for traded goods and space are competitive, while differentiated local goods are sold in a 
monopolistically competitive environment. Variety and local goods positively affect household’s 
utility. On the production side, variety of inputs has an equivalent importance as consumption. 
Production is a function of labor, specialized inputs and space. Labor and space can be taken as 
competitive, while inputs are traded in a monopolistically competitive market. Variety in inputs 
positively affects output (two inputs of different types produce more than two inputs of the same 
type). The amount of inputs and labor positively affects output. The main conclusion of this type of 
model is that variety of goods and inputs yield a dynamic and endogenous externality (centripetal 
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force). The size of the labor force in a particular location determines the variety of goods and inputs. 
The larger is a particular city, the larger the variety of goods and inputs is. The well-being of this 
city increases its size by attracting more labor force. This process stops as long as the centrifugal 
forces are weaker than the centripetal. 
According to Krugman (1998a) any attempt to develop a general-equilibrium model of location 
would be substantially complicated by adding a transportation sector. To simplify the analysis, 
iceberg type transportation cost was first introduced by Samuelson (1954). It is the constant fraction 
of any shipped good that depreciates in transit between two places.
6
 Under this type of costs the 
constant elasticity of demand is preserved. 
NEG models rely heavily on ad hoc, although realistic assumptions. 
7
 Head and Mayer (2003) 
catalog five key ingredients of this paradigm: 
1. Scale economies at firm level. Firms have fixed requirement for limited productive 
resources. 
2. Imperfect competition. Provided the first ingredient, marginal cost is always lower than 
average cost, then perfect competition is an implausible market structure. NEG models are based on 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In particular, consumer’s love of variety, which is captured in by a CES 
utility function that is symmetric in a bundle of differentiated products; and the fact that firms have 
no influence on overall market conditions. 
3. Trade costs. The outputs and inputs used by firms are tradeable over distances but only by 
incurring Samuelson type costs: A fraction of the good depreciates on the way. This assumption 
gets rid of having another industry and a variable demand elasticity. 
4. Endogenous firms locations. Firms enter and exit freely in response to profitability at each 
location. 
5. Endogenous location of demand. Both consumers and firms demand output. Such a demand 
work through two mechanisms that allow a cumulative causation process. Surveys as Ottaviano and 
Thiesse (2003) or Head and Mayer (2003) divide NEG models into two main directions according 
to the location of demand. One, is at regional level by assuming labor mobility across regions. The 
other, at international level by assuming labor immobility, and that industrial production requires 
the output of their sector as intermediate inputs. 
                                                          
6 The concept of distance is not considered in NEG models. Then, transportation costs do not depend on the distance between two 
locations. However, Mansori (2003) is an exception in the literature by introducing increasing returns to scale in trade costs. 
7 In our conclusions we explain some weakness of the NEG approach. 
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Krugman (1979) introduces for the first time a model of monopolistic competition with 
international trade. This paper is the genesis of the NT literature and is a natural reference to NEG 
models. Its setting generates intra-industry trade between countries with identical technology and 
endowments. Indeed, the comparative advantage cost theory predicts no trade among countries with 
similar preferences, technology and factor endowment. This NT static model uses Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) framework by incorporating in his model one industrial sector with firms that exhibit 
increasing returns of scale, imperfect competition, endogenous firm´s location, trade costs and labor 
immobility between countries. Its most remarkable outcomes are related to the gains of trade. In 
particular, within a monopolistic competition framework and two countries without labor mobility 
between them, international trade openness implies that some firms are forced to exit and the ones 
that still remain in business expand out their production, and consequently, operating at lower 
average cost. In other words, the number of product varieties produced in one country decreases 
after trade barriers fall. The first source of gain from trade comes out of the love of variety 
principle: in each country consumers have access to more product varieties with both local and 
foreign origin. The second source of gain comes out higher wages. However, if preferences are 
represented by a CES function, then varieties produced do not vary in each country. In other words, 
there are no gains from taking advantage of the scale of production, and consumers gain solely by 
having more varieties.  
An extension of Krugman (1979) is Krugman (1980), which is also a seminal work on NT 
theory that formalizes the concept of “home market effect “(HME) and “the price index effect” 
(PIE). It underlies the importance of initial market size to determine the national industrial structure. 
It takes the first four ingredients listed in our introduction. In each country two types of 
differentiated goods are produced; each one has its own consumers. The proportion of the 
population in country i that consumes good j is defined as the market size of good j. Labor in this 
sector is fixed, immobile and equal across countries. Thus, we have two countries with equal 
population, technology but trading both types of good. Different markets sizes across countries is 
allowed. There are four important outcomes which at some extend keep being valid in further 
models. One is the HME: the country with the larger market size of a particular good will attract 
disproportionately more firms that produce such a good, and therefore become a net exporter. Two, 
incomplete specialization is greater, the greater trade costs and the less important scale economies 
are. For example, with very low trade costs and large economies of scale countries will thoroughly 
specialize. Three, incomplete specialization implies that each country will export all of its varieties 
of both types of goods. And finally four, is the PIE that arises when consumers share the same 
utility function: the larger a country is, the lower industrial price index have because a small 
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proportion of this country’s industrial good consumption bears trade costs. Yet, Krugman (1980) is 
unable to explain that small shocks can lead to permanent effects.  
Helpman and Krugman (1985) is a generalization of Krugman (1980). The innovations in this 
framework are three. First, there are two sectors, a commodity that is produced under constant 
returns to scale in a perfect competitive market and traded at zero cost; and an industrial good that is 
a differentiated good in a monopolistic competition market. The second element is that population 
(labor force) across countries is not equal. And finally, preferences are Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
type. The HME and the PIE keep being valid. 
Agglomeration in Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) can only arise through 
the magnification of the initial market size asymmetries. Nevertheless, Davis (1998) modifies 
slightly Helpman and Krugman´s (1985) assumptions to turn down the HME. In particular, it is 
assumed that the commodity is traded at a positive cost. The industrial’s good assumptions on 
technology and market structure keep being untouched. This tiny departure, which is empirically 
justified, gives the following proposition. Each country will produce the industrial good variety 
according to each country’s market size, and the agricultural good will not be traded whatsoever. In 
sum, location effects vanish. This is how the model works. Assuming that each country produces 
the commodity good according to its own requirements hence in each country industry sector is also 
distributed according to its market size. If some firms move into the larger country, then trade in the 
commodity good increases, whereas trade in the industrial god falls. Given that trade costs are equal 
for both goods, then total aggregated costs of trade increase and shifted firms find the move 
unprofitable.  
In sum, in NT models large regions firms will be net exporters with higher relative wages. For 
Ottaviano and Puga (1998), this approach still has important shortcomings that are attacked by the 
NEG approach. First, NT theory conceives differences in production structure through differences 
in underlying characteristics. It starts by assuming that there are regions with large and small 
markets, but does nothing to explain why this division arises. Second, it does not explain why firms 
in particular sectors tend to locate close to each other, leading regional specialization .Third, it 
presents industrial development as taking place gradually and simultaneously in all underdeveloped 
regions, while in practice industry spreads successively from country to country. 
NEG is set up, among others, by Krugman (1991) core-periphery (C-P) model, which is based 
upon Helpman and Krugman (1985), shows that small temporary shocks give rise to large 
permanent differences between two regions. One is the core of industrial production and the other is 
a periphery, which employs all of its labor force in the commodity production. The new ingredient 
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in this framework is factor mobility: labor force can decide the location to carry out its activities. It 
turns out that the HME could be exacerbated by the combination of increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect competition. It consists of two regions which are identical in endowments, technology 
and preferences. In each region, there is a labor endowment consisting of farmers and workers. 
There are two sectors in each region, commodity and industrial. The former exhibits constant 
returns to scale technology with farmers as the only factor of production. It produces a homogenous 
good sold in an interregional competitive market. The commodity sector trade costs are neglected. 
The latter sector technology exhibits increasing returns to scale with workers as the only factor of 
production. The industrial good is sold in an interregional imperfect competitive market, where 
there firms produce a different variety of the industrial good and exit and entry is costless. The 
manufacturing sector trade costs are Samuelson type and could be positive. Only workers can move 
across regions. Both farmers and workers have a common Cobb-Douglas utility function with 
preferences over the commodity and a CES utility function, which incorporates n differentiated 
products. 
A stable and dispersed equilibrium arises for prohibitive trade costs. It consists of two identical 
economies in autarchy: wages, prices, output and varieties are determined within each region. No 
trade takes place. A core-periphery stable pattern, in which the whole industrial sector is 
agglomerated in one region, arises in the following way. If a larger number of firms is located in 
one region (a deviation from the dispersed equilibrium) a circular causation is generated through 
forward and backward linkages (linkages between firms and workers/consumers). More firms imply 
more variety of products, and lower prices and profits. Such a situation attracts more workers from 
the other region due to higher real wages (forward linkages). More consumers implies a larger 
demand and ease competition in the labor market that attracts more firms (backward linkages). 
More firms implies more variety of products, and lower prices and profits. This agglomeration 
process emerges if trade costs fall below a critical level. Therefore, through these linkages effects, 
scale economies at the individual firm level are transformed into increasing returns at the level of 
the region as a whole. In this case a stronger market competition associated with more firms is 
dominated by location decisions of firms. This dynamics depends on historical accidents: small 
initial differences trigger this evolution process. 
We cannot fail to notice the following exotic dynamics of Krugman´s (1991) predictions (see 
figure 2). First, we find a non-negative relationship between trade openness and concentration; 
however, the shape of the stable equilibrium is discontinuous and non monotonic. Second, a gradual 
fall of trade costs does not imply anything, in terms of stability, except in some specific range of 
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trade costs where a deviation could arise an abrupt equilibrium change. And third, with low trade 
costs full agglomeration is predicted. Mossay (2006) proves the existence and uniqueness of the 
short-run equilibrium of Krugman´s (1991) C-P model.  
 
Figure 2. Krugman´s Fundamental Relationship between Trade Costs and Agglomeration 
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3. The Bell-Shaped Curve of International Trade Openness 
How trade openness in the form of a bilateral trade arrangement or a multi-country union custom, 
may change industrial location and wages around the world? Accordant with Krugman and 
Venables (1995), over time policy circles have had two opposite perspectives over the impact of 
globalization on the North-South divide. On the one hand, during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s they 
claimed that integration produced a rise in the living standards of rich nations at expense of the poor 
ones. Accordingly most of the developing countries implemented trade policies that followed the 
“import-substitution industrialization” paradigm, which supports the idea of low levels of 
international openness as an optimal policy to foster internal industrialization.
8
 For example, 
Krugman and Hanson (1993) point out that Mexico in the last century undertook protectionist trade 
policies to avoid a dependent relationship with the U.S. economy. Krueger (1997) explains that 
developing countries were also motivated to close their markets based upon the infant industry 
argument: new firms face higher costs relative to incumbent firms operating abroad. On the other 
hand, Krugman and Venables (1995) claim that during the 1990s there was a growing concern in 
the developed countries on the effects of integration. In the U.S. “respectable voices” considered 
that local jobs would move to Mexico searching for lower wages and more flexible regulations. In 
                                                          
8 However, some countries like Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore shifted toward outward-oriented policies. 
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Europe, official documents claimed that developing manufacturing countries had an adverse impact 
on its employment rates.  
What explains this reversal in the conventional thinking? In a world with two identical countries, 
in terms of tastes and technology, Puga (1999) theoretically reconciles both visions and displays a 
different menu of possibilities than standard trade theory does. At intermediate trade costs industrial 
location has a C-P pattern. However, as trade barriers fall industrial concentration gradually 
vanishes. Furthermore, at zero trade costs welfare convergence is also reached between these two 
countries, which is also a result in Krugman and Venables (1995). In sum, the curve that shapes the 
share of industrial location or welfare as trade costs fall looks like a bell à la Kuznets. Puga (1999) 
is inspired by a very important question regarding European integration: Will European economic 
geography features, like income disparities across regions and manufacturing concentration, 
converge to that of the U.S.? At regional level, where labor mobility is allowed, Wheaton and 
Shishido (1981) also reconcile both visions by arguing that a clear dominance of the prime city and 
a widening urban-rural wage gap are highly expected to come up during early stages of economic 
growth. As development proceeds, spatial dispersion and narrowing wage differential should occur. 
Hence, the emergence of a C-P pattern would be followed by convergence. 
Krugman and Venables (1995)
9
 is a seminal paper that formalizes the bell-shaped curve of 
economic change. It is the international version of Krugman´s (1991) C–P framework. Two new 
assumptions are incorporated. First, it rules out regional labor mobility but incorporates labor 
mobility across sectors. Put another way, the labor agglomeration mechanism is domestic, so when 
a sector expands the labor supply must come from the other sector. Wages in the other country is 
not a dispersion force anymore. Second, the industrial sector uses part of its own production as 
inputs. This assumption creates new cumulative agglomeration forces known as forward and 
backward linkages. Both forces arise when firms simultaneously consider the other firms as 
suppliers and consumers of inputs, respectively. Recall that Krugman´s (1991) model centrifugal 
forces decline with trade costs at an even more rapid rate than the centripetal forces that promote 
agglomeration 
Their main results can be divided into three parts. In the first one, trade costs are prohibitive, 
then a symmetric and stable equilibrium arises. In this equilibrium both regions are characterized by 
zero profits, equal real wages across sectors, same price for each variety and positive activity in 
both sectors. Any deviation from this outcome, for example, when the number of manufacturing 
firms increases in one region, affects firm’s profitability through four channels. The standard 
                                                          
9 The working title for Krugman and Venables (1995) is “History of the World, Part I”. 
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channel (á la Chamberlain) reduces the profits by shifting down the demand that each firm faces. 
However, the channel called forward linkage reduces total and marginal costs because inputs are 
cheaper. The backward linkage shifts the demand up of each firm because the total expenditure on 
manufactured products also increases. Both linkages generate higher profits. The stability of this 
equilibrium rests on the net outcome generated from this deviation. Finally, the labor market 
channel increases wages costs due to a higher local labor demand. The negative effect on profits of 
the standard and the labor markets channels outweighs the forward and backward linkages effects.  
The second part of this story starts when trade costs fall below a critical threshold. Both 
symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, which are stable are possible.
10
 In the asymmetric 
equilibrium, the world arises into a high real wage industrial “core” and a low real wage agricultural 
“periphery”. In the core region the price index is low and nominal wages are equal or greater than 
one, thus real wages are high and all labor force is concentrated in the manufacturing sector. 
Consumers import all their agricultural goods and import a small amount of manufactured goods. In 
the periphery region the price index is high and nominal wages equal to one, thus real wages are 
low and most labor force is concentrated on the agricultural sector. Most of the manufactured goods 
are imported.
11
  
The third part comes up for lower trade costs, where only the asymmetric equilibrium is 
sustainable. As the transport costs keep declining real wages in both regions converge in a non 
monotonic way, in particular they describe a bell-shaped pattern in the core region. The lower 
transportation costs are, the weaker the forward and backward linkages in the periphery region are, 
thus firms star moving to the periphery region because wages are lower. At zero transportation costs 
real wages are higher than real wages in the symmetric equilibrium with prohibitive transportation 
costs.  It is worth mentioning that Krugman and Venables (1995) focus their attention on welfare 
implications of trade openness rather than industrial clustering. 
Venables (1996) provides some notions of another agglomeration force through backward and 
forward linkages, which are already present in Krugman and Venables (1995). Even without labor 
mobility an input-output structure may constitute a force of agglomeration. It assumes two regions 
and three sectors. The commodity sector´s technology exhibits non-increasing returns to scale, 
whereas the other two industrial sectors´ technology exhibit increasing returns and are vertically 
linked through an input-output structure. Downstream firms use an aggregate of upstream varieties 
as an intermediate output. Such a structure creates two agglomeration forces. One is a forward 
linkage which push upstream sector to increases their sales by locating where there are relatively 
                                                          
10 For intermediate transport costs there are other two unstable equilibria 
11 It is possible to have a extreme C-P pattern at some level of trade costs. 
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many downstream firms. The other one is a backward linkage which pushes firms in the 
downstream sector to reduce costs by locating where there are relatively many upstream firms. The 
fact that both upstream and downstream industries are monopolistically competitive makes the 
agglomeration forces arise solely through market interactions. By assuming interregional labor 
immobility the location of the demand works as an opposite force of agglomeration. The balance of 
these centripetal and centrifugal forces depends on the strength of the vertical linkages and trade 
costs.  
Economic integration that implies lower trade costs will lead to either divergence or 
convergence between regions. The final outcome depends on the strength of both vertical and trade 
costs. For weak vertical linkages and low trade costs, then firms’ location depends on wage 
differences and dispersion is a feasible outcome. For strong vertical linkages and intermediate trade 
costs clustering may arise. Another conclusion is related to welfare implications of industrial 
clustering. Firms clustering together attract more firms and can support a relative high wage. A clue 
element in this model is that imperfect competition allows that vertical linkages get a relevant role. 
Puga and Venables (1997) is a generalization of Krugman and Venables (1995) for M countries. 
The authors cope with the location effects of geographically discriminatory trade policy. More 
precisely, they analyze welfare implications of economic integration by considering three cases: 
Global integration, free trade areas and hub-and-spoke arrangements. Their key assumption is that 
in the manufacturing sector firms require final goods as inputs. Under global integration, all firms 
regardless of their location have equal access to any foreign market. For high trade costs, each 
country is self-sufficient, with production domestically oriented in both sectors. A symmetric 
equilibrium arises where all nations have the identical values for all endogenous variables. If the 
trade costs fall below a threshold, an asymmetric equilibrium arises where its precise 
characterization varies with the number of nations and the share of industry in consumer 
expenditure. When there are two nations we return to Krugman and Venables (1995).  
The second case is related to preferential arrangements like NAFTA: Trade openness takes place 
in a club of two or more countries but each member implement independent trade policies with the 
rest of the world. If they share their trade policy they become a custom union like the E.U. or 
MERCOSUR. For M=3, where two countries move toward a free trade area and the third one is 
outside the club the following immediate consequence arises: The number of firms increases and 
welfare in each country that belongs to the free trade area and decreases in the third one. The 
intuition behind this result is that firms within the free trade area face lower costs compared to firms 
outside the area. Thus, firms are attracted to countries that belong to the free area. As integrations 
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proceeds the countries within the area converge in welfare but not in industrial share. The country 
outside the area is negatively affected in its welfare and industrial share. 
Finally, hub-and spoke arrangements are bilateral trade agreements between a country (the hub) 
and a set of countries (the spokes); however, among the latter ones there are trade barriers between 
them. A case is the association agreements between E.U. and some Eastern European countries. For 
M=3, where one country has a trade agreement with the other two countries, but these ones haven’t 
liberalized their trade among them. The immediate results are that the number of firms and welfare 
increases in all countries, however, the change is larger for the hub than for the spokes. As 
integration proceeds welfare converges but not completely. 
Puga (1999) is a major contribution to the NEG literature. As result of the interaction between 
the agricultural sector and the manufacturing sector in an international context, the exotic dynamics 
of location and trade costs relationship is eliminated. Recall that in Krugman (1991) factors are 
specific to each sector and in Krugman and Venables (1995) the labor’s supply elasticity from the 
agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector is perfect. In both cases, agglomeration does not 
affect wages in the agricultural industry. Puga (1999) two novel assumptions are that we have 
decreasing returns in agriculture and firm entry and exit is a gradual process:  
The first case is when wage differentials are eliminated by allowing interregional mobility in a 
context of input/output linkages as Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996) model. 
Labor distribution across sectors is endogenous to the model. For high international trade costs (T0), 
the symmetric equilibrium is stable. If we do not assume input/output linkages we return to Puga 
(1999); further assuming that the distribution of workers is exogenous we have Krugman (1991) 
framework. If A<To, then we have a unique symmetric and stable equilibrium. In this case, if one 
region had more firms than the other, then competition will be stronger and profits would turn 
profits negative, inducing firms to relocate in the region with fewer firms. If A>To>S, then the 
symmetric equilibrium is still stable but is no unique; there are two stable agglomeration equilibria. 
In this case, full agglomeration, say region 1, is possible because input/output linkages are strong 
enough and trade costs are low such that is possible to compete in distant markets. It is worth 
mentioning that profits for any deviant firm to region 2 are negative ensuring stability of the 
equilibrium. If S > T0 then the symmetric equilibrium is unstable but is no unique and the two 
agglomeration equilibria keep being stable. Any deviation from the symmetric equilibrium raises 
profits in region with more firms and reduces profits with fewer firms, then industry will eventually 
agglomerate. 
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The second case or the international version does not allow regional labor mobility, then labor 
endowment is fixed in each region and real wages are not required to be equal across regions in 
equilibrium. At high trade costs, firms locate according to the market size. At intermediate trade 
costs firms locate according to backward and forward linkages. At low trade costs firms locate 
where wages are lower. The contribution of this model is that it gets rid of the discontinuity of the 
share of the industry curve.  
In figure 3, f(h) denotes the fraction of the population in the foreign (home) country in the 
industrial sector. In figure 4, rwf(h) denotes the real wage of the population in the foreign (home) 
country in the industrial sector. 
 
Figure 3. Puga´s Bell Shape of International Trade Openness 
 
 
Figure 4. Puga´s Bell Shape of International Trade Openness 
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So far trade openness has been considered reciprocal between two or more countries. Puga and 
Venables (1999) address location effects of unilateral changes in trade policy by one active country. 
The first case is an import substitution policy, which successfully attracts industry. Under this 
policy there are two opposite effects. One is that as a result of higher prices of inputs incentives to 
firms to set up in the active country are weakened. But pulling in the opposite direction is the 
increasing in expenditure on industrial goods in the active country. The second case is trade 
liberalization also promotes industrialization in the active country. Within an interval trade costs 
induce zero industrialization. Above that range the active country attracts firms but real income has 
not so evident increase. Below this interval real income is higher the lower trade costs are and 
attraction of firms takes place as well.  
 
Empirical Literature 
Forslid et al. (2002) apply a full scale computable GE-model to investigate whether the 
outcomes and rationale of stylized NEG models, like Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables 
(1995), keep being valid in a more complex world. Traditionally, NEG models simplify their 
settings by dealing with two locations, two industries and two factors economy structure. This paper 
is based on Haaland and Norman (1992) model with the following departures. They assumes 10 
regions (4 are associated with Europe: North, South, West and Central), 14 sectors and 3 factors of 
production, and both intra-industry and inter-industry linkages. For each predetermined level of 
trade costs the full set of parameters are obtained by three ways: calibration, assumption and 
secondary sources. In this framework, the relative weight of concentration forces depends on the 
level of trade costs. For high trade costs consumer proximity considerations determine location of 
production. For intermediate trade costs, input demand and input supply proximity considerations 
dominate location decisions. For low trade costs factor-market competition considerations 
determine location: specialization arises according to comparative advantage. 
Their analysis proceeds in two parts. First, they show how production in different sectors 
changes as trade costs are reduced between the four European regions. Second, the authors simulate 
the absolute concentration index of the four European regions as trade costs are lowered.  
In the first part the most striking result comes from the textile, leather and food sectors, which 
show a monotonic increase in agglomeration. Textile industry moves out of Central into West and 
South. Textile sector is a candidate for relocation effects because it has relatively strong within-
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industry linkages. Initial textile production is slightly higher in West than Central. Then such a 
difference explains why production of textiles moves out of Central into West. Besides, South has a 
comparative advantage in the production of labor intensive goods as textiles. The leather sector 
concentrates exclusively in South. This can be explained by using the same arguments of the textile 
case. However, the initial production in South is considerably larger than the other regions. Besides 
as trade costs get lower the relocation movement is softer because it has a very low own input share. 
The food industry, which is relatively capital intensive, agglomerates in North for low trade costs. 
This can be explained by the comparative advantage of North. In addition to this, market size 
proximity is irrelevant because food industry is characterized by low returns to scale and a low own 
input share. 
In the second part they simulate the location effects on industry at aggregated level in Europe. 
Textiles, leather products and food products concentrate in Europe with respect to the rest of the 
world as trade barriers fall; while metals, machinery and chemicals decreases. In the former case, a 
combination of comparative advantage factors and vertical linkages explain such movements. The 
latter is explained basically by increasing returns to scale. 
Combes and Lafourcade (2004) evaluate the relevance of concentration and dispersion forces 
contemplated in NEG models for France. In particular, the authors estimate the parameters of an 
inter-regional trade model that includes two novel features. First, there are real strategic interactions 
and competition consequences within a Cournot framework. Secondly, labor market is neglected; in 
other words, there are no wage gaps. Two basic forces intervene in the location of firms. On the one 
hand, final and intermediate demands, and input costs are agglomeration forces. On the other hand, 
higher competition on the product markets is a dispersion force. They find that the centre (Paris) 
and its periphery (Marseille) firms’ mark-ups are higher than middle points (Lyon). In the former 
case low trade costs offsets competition; in the latter case lower competition outweighs high trade 
costs. Furthermore, the economy displays a mono-centric pattern where Paris has larger profits and 
decay with distance. Lower trade costs reduce inter-regional disparities and intra-regional 
disparities. 
According to Head and Mayer (2003) one of the research lines within NEG empirical work 
consider the impact of geographical distribution of demand as an explanatory variable. In this vein, 
Overman et al. (2003) find that variations in per capita income can be explained by the access to 
markets and sources of supply. In a first stage, trade equation, which is based on country dummies, 
provides estimates of market access and supply capacities. The authors then proceed in a second 
stage as follows. First they regress per capita income on market access controlling for other 
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determinants of income level like technology, resource endowments, other features of physical 
geography and institutional variables. Their main results are that market access is statistically 
significant to explain GDP per capita across countries. Second they regress machinery and 
equipment relative prices on supply access and find a negative relationship. Put another way, the 
better the supply access the lower are the inputs and factor production. And finally, predetermining 
the values of costs shares of intermediates and the elasticity of substitution between varieties, GDP 
per capita is regressed on both market and supply access. Overman et al. (2003) use an alternative 
trade equation, which is based on both country dummies, geographic and economic variables 
(access to coast, island status or distance to the E.U., U.S and Japan). Under this specification 
results have similar pattern of results. In addition to this, five countries are taken to predict changes 
in their GDP per capita as other geographic features change as well. For example, changing the 
status of landlocked countries like Paraguay or Zimbabwe increases substantially their GDP. Same 
thing happens by shortening the distance to Central Europe.  The main conclusions are that wages 
do not determine location of firms. Other factors like geographical advantage are also significant for 
location. On other hand, for a given location of production distance keep being an obstacle for 
investment and trade. However, geographical advantages can improve as new industrial centers 
emerge.  
Overman et al. (2003) decompose the South East Asian exports rate of growth into the 
contributions of improvements external demand and increased external supply. From a new trade 
model a system of equation is solved to obtain both foreign market and supply capacities growth 
rates for four periods. For 13 South East Asian economies exports performance have been 
remarkable. For example, Vietnam exports rate of growth from 82/85 period to 94/97 period was of 
1512.52. Consequently, both market and supply access present remarkable rates of growth. The 
authors obtain the contribution of 9 regions to the South East Asian 13 countries. 
By partially following, Head and Mayer’s (2003) suggestions, Gatica Arreola and Ramirez Grajeda 
(2006) test Puga’s (1999) fundamental bell-shaped relationship between trade openness and 
agglomeration in the industrial sector. In a world with two countries, they estimate the theoretical 
range of international trade costs in which agglomeration is expected: the share of industry, in terms 
of production or employment, is larger than its labor endowment share. On the other hand, from 
bilateral trade and production data they obtain a theoretical level of trade openness. Therefore, their 
hypothesis according to Puga (1999), states that the shorter is the distance from this value to the 
middle point of the interval, the larger is agglomeration. With information on 28 OECD countries, 
14 years and 29 industrial branches, they find that for every sector, the employment and production 
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gap gets larger as the level of trade openness gets closer to the center of the agglomeration interval. 
Nevertheless, there is no empirical support pertaining to the impact on the employment share. 
 
4. Metropolis and International Trade 
According to Alonso-Villar (2001), urban centers were an exceptional phenomenon until the 19
th
 
century. For example, classical Rome in the 1
st
 century, clusters of business in the Middle Ages like 
Venice or Bruges, or capitals of the new absolutist states in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries like London 
or Paris. Political centralization and the growth of international trade led to the overall urban 
population localized in only few cities, all of which were capitals. Nevertheless, Ades and Glaeser 
(1995) argue that the growth of Tokyo (Edo) in the 18
th
 century is explained by Krugman and Livas 
(1996) international trade hypothesis. A centralized regime reduced foreign trade, which 
strengthened the centripetal forces of agglomeration that fostered an urban “giant”12.  
For Alonso-Villar (2001), modern urbanization started during the Industrial Revolution in cities 
of the United Kingdom like Birmingham, Leeds or Manchester, which attracted new labor force. 
This process extended across other countries like Germany, northern France and the east coast of 
the U.S.. Before 1900 this process was pretty much European. In traditional societies the functions 
of cities were mainly administrative, commercial, religious and craft-related. Yet during the 20
th
 
century concentration of population has appeared not only in Europe but also around the world. In 
the last decades urban population in Latin America, Asia and Africa has grown dramatically. For 
Henderson (2001), 75 per cent of Latin America’s population is urbanized and 30 per cent in Asia. 
Inspired by the case of Mexico City, Krugman and Livas (1996) argue that Third World 
metropolis will tend to shrink as developing countries open their markets. Trade openness within a 
country involves larger markets for any of its production sites, driving firms to relocate close to 
foreign markets such as border regions or port cities. Incentives to move out are stronger for small 
countries because its local market represents a low proportion with respect to its foreign markets. 
Other papers as Venables (1998), Alonso-Villar (2001) and Mansori (2003) address the link 
between trade openness and spatial considerations as well. 
Krugman and Livas (1996) consider that there are centripetal and centrifugal forces whose 
balance depend on trade costs and determine industry agglomeration. Centripetal forces involve, in 
Hirschman´s (1958) words, backward and forward linkages. The former are related to market 
                                                          
12 In the late 16th century, Japan was unified by Tokugawa Ieyasu who concentrated high levels of economic and political power. Ieyasu 
descendants closed the country to any foreign contact. In the mid 19th century, Japan was forced by the US to open its economy to foreign 
trade. 
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access; the latter are related to good access to intermediate inputs. Centrifugal forces are external 
diseconomies, land rents and the attraction of moving away from highly competitive urban areas to 
less competitive rural ones. They focus their attention on the Mexico City case where the centripetal 
forces traditionally have dominated the centrifugal forces. Mexico was a closed economy under the 
Import-Substitution Industrialization paradigm. However, once Mexico was opened up to 
international markets, domestic final goods demand and domestic input supply weight less as a 
centripetal force. The existence giant Third World metropolis are a consequence of strong backward 
and forward linkages. Policies which tend to open the economy weaken these linkages and, 
consequently, foster dispersion. 
Krugman and Livas (1996) formalize their story through a mathematical model. In this survey 
we present an extended model featured in Fujita et al.(1999). There are four cities which are thin 
and narrow. Cities 1 to 3 are domestic locations and city 0 is considered the rest of the world. The 
only factor of production is labor, which is fixed and can move across domestic cities. Within each 
city real wages net of a congestion cost are equal across agents. If there is a difference in wages 
between cities 1 and 2 people start moving to the city where the wages are higher. Agglomeration 
makes sense because the existing technology exhibits increasing returns to scale.  
There are two assumptions in Krugman and Livas (1996) to preserve the constant elasticity of 
demand facing firms. One is the usual iceberg type trade costs of goods between local cities of 1/T.; 
and two, an iceberg type international trade cost of 1/T0 for imported goods from location 0, which 
results from a combination of transportation costs and trade protectionism. Both the cost for people 
of moving from one domestic city to the other and exports costs are zero. Although Krugman and 
Livas´ (1996) model is quite simple, it is too complicated to be solved analytically. So they present 
a numerical example. And using the tricks of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) they can get fundamental 
equations to explain the existence of big metropolis.  
In both figures, the center represents equal distribution of the population across cities. Points 
(0, 0), (0.5, 0.86) and (1, 0) mean that the whole domestic population is concentrated in cities 1, 2 or 
3, respectively. The middle point between the line that joins points (0, 0) and (0.5, 0.86) means that 
total population is equally divided between cities 1 and 2. In these figures, the initial point of an 
arrow is a point which represents a short-term equilibrium given a particular distribution of the 
population. This means that real wages might be different across cities, then labor immigration is 
expected to generate a new distribution. The length of the arrow represents the magnitude of labor 
movements over time across cities (Δλ1, Δλ2, Δλ3) and the direction represents the sign of these 
changes (Δλj≥0 or Δλj<0).  
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Figure 5 shows that for high levels of international trade costs (T0 = 1.9), partial 
concentration in one city is a stable long-run equilibrium. It should be pointed out that concentration 
in one city is not total because a small fraction of the total population is distributed across the rest of 
the cities. Equal distribution between three or two cities implies an unstable equilibrium. Internal 
and international trade takes place and all varieties produced in the economy are consumed in all 
cities. The main city produces a large variety of goods and the secondary cities produce a limited 
variety of goods and trade between cities is balanced. Figure 6 shows that the equal distribution of 
population in the domestic country is a stable long-run equilibrium for high levels of trade 
openness. Partial concentration in one or two cities is unstable.  
With high international trade costs, both firms and workers, by emphasizing their expenditure on 
national goods magnify the market size effects of agglomeration through prices and nominal wages. 
In other words, an extra worker in a particular city represents a higher demand and such a benefit 
always offsets fiercer competition in the labor market. Thus, equilibrium is reached when 
congestion costs are high enough to prevent further agglomeration. For lower trade costs (T0 = 1) 
imports weight in agents’ expenditure is large enough such that any deviation from the dispersed 
equilibrium is associated with weak market size effects. 
The intuition behind Krugman and Livas´ (1996) results can be summarized as follows. This 
model suggests a link between protectionism and the size of big metropolis of protective countries. 
International firms supply every location in the country. Domestic firms pay lower transport costs 
when serving their own location. Then, domestic prices, net of travel, are lower where domestic 
firms are agglomerated. Trade barriers imply that domestic suppliers take over the market. Prices, 
net of transport costs, are lower for domestic goods in the central city because firms are located in 
that city. Workers then come to the city to pay lower prices for domestic goods. Trade openness 
implies that imported goods are a large part of consumption. Imports are more expensive in the 
central city, so workers spread over space to save on congestion costs. 
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Figure 5. Urban Agglomeration without International Trade 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
 
 
Figure 6. Urban Agglomeration with International Trade 
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Alonso-Villar (2001) follows the Krugman and Livas´ (1996) setting by arguing that 
agglomeration arises as a result of increasing returns of scale, transports costs, labor mobility and 
the relative position of a country with respect in terms of industrialization. Congestion is the 
selected dispersion force. The model assumes an economy as a horizontal line (see Figure 7) 
divided into three segments: A, B and C. The left segment, A, has a city in its extreme. The middle 
segment, B, has two cities, 1 and 2, in each extreme. The right segment, C, has a city in its extreme.  
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Figure 7. Alonso Villar´s Urban Structure 
 
 
 
World population is normalized to 1. i is the proportion of world population in location i (i=a, 
1, 2 and c). This paper analyzes the centripetal and centrifugal forces, which drive concentration in 
one of the cities in segment B. First, the paper analyzes the factors that affects agglomeration. 
Alonso-Villar (2001) defines the short term equilibrium as Krugman (1991) does: given an initial 
distribution of the population between locations the model determines prices, amounts of goods, 
number of firms and wages in each city given labor immobility. The long run equilibrium is divided 
into two cases, autarchy and free trade. Under autarky, the results are that under high congestion 
costs, any wage differential between city 1 and 2 take 1 back to the original point 1=0.5; under 
low congestion costs the original equilibrium is unstable. Therefore, agglomeration is less likely for 
high congestion costs. Under free trade, if a=c, 1=2 an b is high then the original equilibrium 
is stable. It means that trade openness does not weaken the original agglomeration forces. If b is 
low then the original equilibrium is unstable if trade openness is above a threshold. In sum, if the 
Dominican Republic has a BTA with the U.S., it will concentrate its population in the capital if 
there is a wage gap with respect to the second most important city. The U.S. spatial organization 
will be untouched. 
Contrary to Krugman and Livas (1996) and Alonso-Villar´s (2001) results, Mansori (2003) 
concludes that under increasing returns to scale in the cost of trade, trade liberalization may cause 
big cities to concentrate even more industry. His assumption is that trade of costs are positive for 
local and foreign transactions. However, there are two types of outcomes after trade barriers fall. 
One is that some megalopolis that are already in equilibrium do not change their size; the other is 
that the size can be larger. Buenos Aires and Bangkok fall in the former case; the latter could be 
Seoul. Mansori (2003) has four conclusions. First, in welfare terms a dispersed equilibrium is 
preferable that a C-P pattern. Second, infrastructure improvements can deviate a country from C-P 
pattern equilibrium to a dispersed one. Third, a country can move from a dispersed equilibrium to a 
C-P pattern as a result of trade openness. And finally, trade openness can negatively affect welfare 
because gains from trade can be offset by congestion costs that arise from concentration. 
 
 
A                                       B                                    C 
1                             2 
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Empirical Literature 
Krugman (1998b) considers that empirical work has failed to validate theoretical models of 
monopolistic competition. The new industrial organization has been notoriously better a creating 
interesting models that at generating empirical predictions. The new growth theory gave rise to a 
massive industry of cross-country growth regressions, but with few exceptions, these regressions 
have been neither closely tied to the theory nor a clear evidence (Recall: Sala-i- Martin ran two 
million regressions!). In this section, we present two remarkable papers in the literature. Ades and 
Glaeser (1995) and Hanson (1998). 
Ades and Glaeser (1995) investigate the forces that drives the concentration of a nation’s urban 
population in a single city. They define two types of forces. Economic forces as high tariffs, low 
levels of international trade and high costs of internal trade. First, high tariffs, high costs of internal 
trade and low levels of international trade increase the degree of concentration. Second, political 
stability negatively affects urban population’s share. Third, they conclude that political factors 
affect urban concentration but not the other way around. In part, validates Krugman and Livas 
(1996) approach. 
They use a sample of 85 observations (the main city in 85 countries). Their main results are the 
following. First, main cities are 42 percent larger in population, on average, if they are also capital 
cities. This fact means that power attracts population and that capitals are located in larger cities. 
Second, a 10 percent increase in the size of the country increases population in the main city by 
about 1.2 percent. Third, a one standard-deviation increase in the share of trade in GDP reduces the 
size of the main city 13 percent. Fourth, main cities are 45 percent larger in countries with 
dictatorial regimes. And fifth, a rise 1 percent increase in the ratio of import duties rises the size of 
the central city by 3 percent.  
Hanson (1998) summarizes the literature on changes in spatial organization among North 
American countries after NAFTA. After forty years of industrialization based on the import-
substitution paradigm, Mexico opened its economy to international trade in 1986 by becoming a 
member of the GATT. Hanson (1996, 1997) find that trade liberalization has contributed toward the 
breakup of the traditional manufacturing belt on Mexico City, and the formation of new industrial 
centers in the US-Mexican border. Hanson (1996) finds that with trade liberalization, there was a 
substantial relocation of manufacturing activity in the US-Mexican border. There is a significant 
relation of export firms in Mexico and economic activity in the U.S. border. U.S. cities specialize in 
products and components for Mexican assembly plants. Besides, NAFTA has push firms from the 
interior of U.S. to U.S. border cities. Hanson (1997) finds a negative relation between wages and 
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the distance to Mexico City and distance to Mexico-U.S. border. A 10 percent increase in distance 
from Mexico City is associated to a 1.9 percent decrease in the relative state nominal wage. A 10 
percent increase in distance from Mexico-U.S. border is associated to a 1.3 percent decrease in the 
relative state nominal wage. These results suggest that differential in market access foster wage 
differentials. 
Davis and Weistein (2002) analyze the population distribution of Japan under several approaches 
including the increasing returns to scale theory. They use a 7,000 years database from the Stone 
Age to current times. They find that only the fact that density population variation raised during the 
industrial revolution is consistent with the increasing returns to scale theory, but persistence in 
regional densities and mean reversion after temporary shocks. Da Mata et al. (2005) find that city 
growth in Brazil is driven by rural population supply and inter-regional transport improvements and 
spillover effects of knowledge accumulation. 
Ramirez Grajeda and Sheldon (2009) draw upon Fujita et al. (1999) as a theoretical motivation, 
and information on the 5 most important cities of 84 countries, to find that the size of main cities 
declines and the size of secondary cities increases as a result of external trade. Similar results are 
obtained for cities with a population over a million. However, cities with a large fraction of the 
urban population grow independently of their position in the urban ranking.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this survey we cope with trade, development and location issues under the New Economic 
Geography (NEG) approach. Despite the fact that this literature is relatively new exists a consensus 
within the economics profession that its main theoretical outcomes are very appealing. However, it 
is common knowledge that NEG predictions still need to be validated. This task is far from being 
easy for the following fundamental reason: since location issues imply increasing returns to scale, 
then non-linear relationships arise. Furthermore, some of the most representative papers lack of 
analytical solutions and their setting are highly stylized. As a result of this technical obstacle, 
empirical work is not abundant and robust enough. Additionally, lack of data prevails.  
The relationship between space and international trade has come up in mainstream economics 
during the last years, since Krugman (1991). Yet empirical work is also scarce and has weak 
conclusions. Although location considerations have a long tradition, theoretical development is still 
young and it is covered by a limited number of economists. Several unrealistic assumptions in the 
standard literature seem worth pointing out in order to foresee future research. First, population is 
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exogenous; second, distance is generally neglected. Third, agents do not have expectations; Four, 
the analyses take locations as given. In sum, NEG simplify its models assumptions for tractability 
motives but that might limit its prediction power. 
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